A lot of debate appears to have started following the administrative, financial and operational control of the Inter-Services-Intelligence being shifted from the prime minister of Pakistan to the interior ministry and back again to the premier. Whatever the rationale of the present move and counter-move, one must understand some of the fundamental ways of the functioning of the ISI.

As the premier intelligence agency of Islamabad, the assigned job of the ISI is ‘strategic intelligence’ — meaning external intelligence and operations along the lines of British MI-6 and the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America. It is to be noted, however, that the convention is to have only a serving three-star lieutenant general of the Pakistani army heading the ISI as the director-general. By implication, therefore, no serving lieutenant general can afford to bypass or hide anything from his superior four-star general of the Pakistani army, the direct reporting to the Pakistani premier notwithstanding. In other words, every DG-ISI has to play primarily a subservient role to the Pakistani army following the strong institutional tradition of the armed forces vis-à-vis the fragile civilian prime ministerial office in Pakistan. Thus, professionally and operationally, ISI is an extended arm of the coup-prone army.

Little wonder thus that the DG-ISI is inevitably a hand-picked man of the Pakistani army chief. For instance, the present incumbent, Lt-General Nadim Taj, is the long-serving military secretary of the former army chief and current president, Pervez Musharraf. Of equal interest is the fact that the present army chief, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, is the first ISI chief to go up to the highest post in the army.

Often referred to as a “state within a state”, undoubtedly the ISI has undergone a vast change in its role. Now its ambit encompasses virtually everything — terrorism, counter-terrorism, anti-terrorism, state terrorism and what you will — in its watch list. It was bolstered during the days of Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when Zia ul-Haq chose to take up the most dangerous route available: open opposition to the Soviet invasion in the diplomatic chambers of the world while providing covert support to the Afghan opposition operating from Pakistani soil. The ISI’s role in Khalistan movement and Kashmir’s militancy is too well known to be repeated. It is the word ‘covert’ that the ISI has redefined. In tune with this spirit, the DG too is expected to do things covertly, thereby theoretically reporting to the prime minister and actually operating on behalf of his alma mater, the Pakistani Army, which is one of the few stable, disciplined and professional institutions of the country.

Initially, however, the ISI’s role was concentrated more on military intelligence and was not as varied as it is today. Thus when Air Commodore Aziz Ahmed, of the India desk of the ISI directorate, sent a signal on Monday, August 30 1965, that an Indian attack outside Kashmir was imminent, the foreign secretary pooh-poohed the report, with the army top brass following suit. Subsequently, however, the DG-ISI was taken to task by President Ayub Khan on September 7, for his inability to identify the location of India’s 1st armoured division. Clearly, the ISI in the 1960s was not what it is reported to be today.

As referred to earlier, Kremlin’s capture of Kabul in December 1979 catapulted the ISI from the national to the international arena. Suddenly it was flooded with cash worth billions from both the US and Saudi Arabia to counter the red soldiers through the Taliban, jihadis and mujahedins. Thus reported the Afghan cell ISI Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf in the 1980s — “The CIA supported the Mujahedin by spending the American taxpayers’ money, billions of dollars on buying arms, ammunition and equipment.” Pakistan was full of dollars and ISI was invaluable, as the onus of actionable intelligence and actual operation fell solely on it.

The role and profile of the ISI, however, underwent another seminal change after the demise of Zia ul-Haq in August 1988. This was followed by the defeat and departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the emergence of Benazir Bhutto in the political arena of Pakistan. The focus of Pakistan’s defence and diplomatic radar switched from Kabul to Kashmir that subsequently exposed the internal contradiction of the country’s fragile power structure.

Thus, when Bhutto dismissed the DG-ISI, Lt-General Hamid Gul, on May 24 1990, and replaced him with the retired Lt-General Shamsur Rehman Kallue, she clearly set her own house on fire. Gul was a hawk. His behind-the-line support to fundamentalist forces, and the hardline stand of the then army chief, Mirza Aslam Beg, were well known. Their distrust of Bhutto made the army nervous. The die was cast when the ISI had been fiddled with. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the Bhutto government on August 6 1990, on charges of “persistent and scandalous horse trading for political gain, breakdown of law and order in Sindh, corruption and nepotism, and use of statutory corporations, authorities, and banks for political ends and personal gain.” An emergency was imposed and another election followed.

The ISI understandably had to fulfil the role of backroom political players. The old avatar of Pashtun under-covers, sleuths and sharpshooters overnight paved the way for individuals with expertise in dealing with cash, fund transfer and wealth management. Mirza Aslam Beg became the prime mover of the ISI. He was determined to help Bhutto’s main rival, Nawaz Sharif, win the impending polls. Hence he straightaway sacked the Bhutto-appointed DG-ISI and installed his own candidate, Major General Asad Durrani. The army chief also himself organized Rs 140 million from Habib Bank and Meheran Bank in Karachi. The entire amount was deposited in ISI’s accounts and then disbursed by its new boss.

The covert financial role of ISI was subsequently exposed. The list of recipients of money from the ISI included an astounding number of political figures, cutting across ruling and opposition parties, thereby making the ISI the universal supplier of money to ‘all’ Pakistanis.

Knowing all this, one can understand the reasons behind the ISI’s status and prestige in the Pakistani establishment. It is a system unto itself. Two prime ministers, Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, tried to tinker with the system. Both got ousted soon after placing their favoured candidates at the head of the organization, Bhutto in August, 1990, and Nawaz Sharif in October, 1999.

In July, 2008, the ISI boss was not thrown out, but his boss was changed. But the new order lasted less than a day because the current army chief did not like things that way. It is thus quite clear that among the troika of the president, prime minister and the army chief of Pakistan, the last is the most powerful, owing mainly to the institutional strength of the army and the individual fragility of the other two candidates. Hence it is important for the ISI to be present everywhere as the shadow of the Pakistani army. The three most important sectors for the Pakistani army are Kashmir, Kabul and the nuclear button. The ISI-army combination works tirelessly to remain in command of these three key areas.