Indian research institutions have been concentrating for some time on the purchase procedure, user limitations and the supplier restrictions imposed on the INS Jalashva (ex-USS Trenton). But the difficult, and at times impossible situation faced by the buyer in a market that could well be dictated by the seller, especially in naval matters, also needs to be looked into. The legacy of the Indian naval inventory is at the wrong end of the stick today.

Every ship of independent India’s navy in 1947 was of British origin. This monopoly was broken by Indira Gandhi when the first Soviet-built Foxtrot class submarine, Kalvari, arrived in India on July 16, 1968, thereby constituting the pioneer submarine squadron of Indian Navy.

Even in 1980, Indian Navy had ships of only British and Soviet origin. In fact, the six Leander class frigates (Nilgiri 1972; Himgiri ’74; Udayagiri ’76; Dunagiri ’77; Taragiri ’80 and Vindhyagiri ’81), designed and developed by the British were the first major warships built in Indian yards. However, compared to ships of foreign origin, indigenous fighting ships have been few and far between.

The moral of the story is simple. India has had to get used to old, used, second- or third-hand fighting ships owing to the lack of expertise in the area and the absence of an indigenous marine industry. The dependence on the Royal Navy also gives India little choice of ships in the market. Understandably, this compelled India to seek Soviet assistance for new ships.

Old and foreign

The changeover of the Indian Navy from London-built to Moscow-manufactured fleet ran into trouble after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Today the Indian submarine squadron consists of 12 Russian- and four German-built ships. Five out of eight destroyers are made in Moscow; out of 13 frigates, six are Indian, four British and three Russian. Russia’s contribution to corvette construction and deployment stands at ten out of 25 vessels.

The 9/11 attack enhanced the Indian naval profile several notches, owing to changes in American interest, outlook and policy to include virtually all like-minded navies in its endeavour to fight the global war on terror. India thus became a ‘natural ally’ of the United States of America in the vulnerable waterways of the Indian Ocean. As Indian Navy’s horizon and importance broadened, its hardware requirement too became different. The admirals scouted for amphibious transport docks and the market had none except the US navy’s Trenton which was to be decommissioned in 2007. It was a 35-year-old ship, but apparently the age of a ship hardly mattered to New Delhi. The Trenton’s experience and expertise in operating old and used British ships till the Eighties and the three vintage aircraft carriers in its inventory — INS Vikrant, Viraat, and now the INS Vikramaditya (i.e. Gorshkov) which is scheduled to join the fleet in 2010 — were important considerations.

Today, however, the induction of INS Jalashva is under fire from the constitutional body of the Indian establishment. In fact, the way things are happening, every big defence hardware deal in future seems destined to create controversy and a possible call for cancellation and closer scrutiny. The good times of purchase and acquisition, refit and modernization of Indian defence appear to be over. With a budget that is upwards of one lakh crore rupees, all purchases from abroad of tanks, ships, fighters and missiles are likely to set the house on fire. The defence of India requires more than an organized and disciplined hand. Closer coordination and cooperation between the various arms of the defence establishment are required to make India successful in modernizing its military hardware. Or else, the hard times will linger.