Mass surrenders by militants are not new in the Northeast. Neither the army nor the Assam government would really expect the surrender of thirty-odd members of the United Liberation Front of Asom to signal the collapse of the rebellion. But it is an important victory for the authorities, just as it must be a major setback for the Ulfa’s morale. Northeastern insurgencies, like guerrilla wars anywhere, are battles of attrition in which psychological strength may be more important than firepower. The Ulfa has been the most intractable of the insurgents in the region. The end of the Mizo rebellion in 1986 and the decade-long Naga peace talks have not prompted any real change of heart in the Ulfa leadership. On the contrary, the Ulfa leaders abused both the army’s unilateral ceasefire and the recent peace initiative in order to re-group and re-arm its cadre. Worse still, the Assamese rebels have a particularly notorious record of killing innocent people. If the battle against the Ulfa has not had better results so far, it is largely due to the conflicting perceptions and strategies of the army and the state government. Such confusions not only help the rebels but also send out wrong signals to the common people.

The surrender of the Ulfa activists also raises an old question. What the state government does in order to help these rebels join the mainstream is an important element in the fight against insurgency in the region. True, the Union home ministry has an assistance package that includes a monthly stipend and provisions for training the former militants in various trades. But Assam has a rather unsavoury experience of the state government’s handling of the matter. In the Eighties, the ruling Congress sought to use groups of surrendered Ulfa activists for party politics. With an abundant supply of money and other resources from the government, these former rebels became law unto themselves, terrorizing the common people and fleecing businessmen. The chief minister, Tarun Gogoi, cannot afford to repeat those mistakes. Handled carefully, the rebels’ surrender can have its propaganda value. Their stories of the Ulfa leaders’ unethical ways can help bust the myth about the latter’s idealism. If successfully rehabilitated in normal life, they can inspire other rebels to be brave enough to make a new beginning.