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Pervez Musharraf has been in the
line of fire for quite some time. Hence, one is neither
surprised nor shocked at the various versions of media reports
of July 7, on Musharraf’s lucky escape from an anti-aircraft
gun attack. However, what appeared fascinatingly intriguing
was the subsequent denial by the director-general of the
ISI’s public relations, Major General Waheed Arshad, that
rockets had been fired at the president’s aircraft.
But ever since Musharraf staged
a coup and became president in October 1999, there has existed
a threat to his life from all possible and impossible corners
of Pakistan.
The last serious attempts on Musharraf’s
life took place on December 14 and December 25, 2003 respectively,
adjacent to the Army House, the official residence of the
Pakistan army chief in Rawalpindi.
Interestingly, however, the so-called
assassination bid of last Friday took place near the Chaklala
Air Force Base, which is about 4 kms from the Army House
in Rawalpindi, and 10 kms from Islamabad. Chaklala is also
the base of 35 Composite Air Transport Wing from which 6,
12 and 41 squadrons operate the transport fleet of the Pakistan
air force. In brief, Chaklala is not only the headquarters
of the Pakistan air force, but also the hub of the VVIP
movement of the nation.
Close to Chaklala is also stationed
one of the most prestigious and powerful garrisons of the
Pakistan army, the X Corps, at Rawalpindi. With three infantry
divisions, one armoured brigade and two infantry brigades
under the corps, the area between Islamabad and Rawalpindi
could easily be termed as an impregnable fortress of the
Orient. Yet the area was used for taking pot shots at the
chief of the Pakistan army who is the head of the State.
How could it be possible? Was the ‘attempt’ on Musharraf’s
life real or imaginary?
It was reported by the Pakistani
media that the anti-aircraft guns, which were to be used
for shooting down Musharraf’s plane, were of Russian origin,
thereby indicating that they could have been smuggled. However,
a careful scrutiny of the documents of world armament trade
and industry clearly shows that Pakistan till recently had
in possession at least four types of towed anti-aircraft
guns. Initially manufactured by the former Soviet Union,
these were later supplied from the inventory of the Chinese
garrison.
Irrespective of the nature and
quality of the abortive attempt on Musharraf’s life on Friday,
from the neighbourhood of the Chaklala air force base, the
signs of challenge to the reign and rule of the chief of
Pakistan army are too obvious to be ignored. Though Musharraf
is not the first Pakistani army chief to resort to coup,
he perhaps could be the first amongst his three coup predecessors
(Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq) to be shot by his
own countrymen, primarily because he appears to have tinkered
with the religious sentiments of his fraternity. To be fair
to Musharraf, that certainly would be bad for both the military,
mullahs and the merchants of the nation.
If Musharraf falls in the midst
of bloodshed and assassination today, it would be because
of the long string of violence by the ruling class of Islamabad
for its own survival and continuation at the helm of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the desire to prove themselves
as the true torch-bearers of the tenets of political Islam
East of Suez.
Thus, Pakistan may not be the
custodian of the Qaba, but it would love to be seen championing
the cause of Khalistan; support, aid and abet the terrorists
in Kashmir; constantly challenge the Dar-ul-Harb of the
kafirs of Hindustan; encourage- cross-border gun-running
through Khyber; cause panic in the corridors of power in
New Delhi through misadventures like Kargil; maintain a
Kalashnikov culture through the ghazis and jihadis
across the world; and yet be branded as the frontline state
to fight the global war on terrorism.
The problem with Pakistan is that
Musharraf inherited a legacy of violence, and he himself,
as the Pakistani army chief and the president, is a product
of it. The writing on the wall for Musharraf is clear. It
is no longer a question of his staying or going. It is now
a question of when and how he is going. Bad days are looming
for the General. The flip side of the story is that Musharraf’s
fall would be bad for the morale of the Pakistan army, since
it would mean that it had failed to save the life of its
serving commander-in-chief.
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