COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: MILITARY CULTURE AND IRREGULAR WAR By Robert M. Cassidy, Praeger, £28.99

September 11 caused a conceptual shift among the American security analysts. The US political and military elite, oozing confidence in the wake of victory in the first Gulf War, was shocked by the attack on the World Trade Center. A number of the security managers now argue that the so-called “revolution in military affairs (network-centric warfare)” would be of little help to the US armed forces in waging war against terror.

Robert M. Cassidy analyses the reasons behind the rise of ‘global terrorism’ and the various techniques which could be of use to the task forces of different states — the US’s in particular — in their fight against the stateless marginal groups. Cassidy attempts a strategic cultural analysis from a historical perspective. He argues that the guerrillas from Asia are influenced by the Eastern tradition of warfare, which emphasizes attrition, indirect attack, perfidy and protracted struggle. Delay and evasion characterize the Eastern way of warfare. In contrast, the Western tradition is characterized by Clausewitz’s philosophy of focussing on a decisive set-piece battle at a particular time and place against the enemy.

Today, instead of the Marxist-oriented revolutionary guerrilla struggle, the world is witnessing Islamic terrorism. The arc of instability runs from Indonesia in the east to Libya in the west. Cassidy claims that the global jihad against the West could be traced back to the legacies of Muslim response to colonialism. The more recent factors are the collapse of the state structure in the Islamic world, growing emigration into the West and the consequent marginalization and humiliation of the immigrants in the host states. Unable to match the technological prowess of the Western powers, the terrorists try to motivate their warriors to fight and die for a cause — with the clerics playing a important role.

Cassidy warns that the use of merely military force against the terrorists will not provide any solution. Selective use of force is necessary. The use of blunt force would result in huge collateral damage, pushing the disturbed zone further into the lap of the terrorists. Further, the security challenges posed by the terrorists should be met by raising, training and equipping forces from the local communities.

Cassidy could be criticized for adopting a pro-Western view of present-day terrorism. But his warning that the big battle approach is useless against guerrillas is important when we realize the failure of the Indian army to win the ‘small war’ in Kashmir and the travails of the US army in Iraq.