Sajad Lone’s recently released vision document, “Achievable Nationhood”, is a fresh breeze of reason in an atmosphere of reaction and rhetoric. It opens new vistas in thought processes and raises some very pertinent questions. While mainly catering to the political elite, the author also attempts to educate the people in and outside Jammu and Kashmir.

At the beginning, the document dramatically claims that the inception of the militant movement in “1989 in essence marks the end of history”, relegating its role to a mere “witness”. It is naïve to think that the movement in 1989 marks the beginning of the political history of Kashmir. If the movement of 1989 is denied the foundation of the struggle for freedom in 1931, it will remain only as a structure in vacuum.

The real high point of the document is in chapter 2, titled “Psychological and Reality Variables”. This chapter provides a deep insight into the intellectual dilemmas faced by the author: “What is sacrosanct? Sacrifices and resistance based upon aspirations or saving human lives whence movement forward is faced with a dead end...? Idealism or pragmatism?” These are very difficult questions.

The desires of the people of Kashmir get reflected in this passage: “The word sentiment is a psychological translation of the political concept of right to self determination...People of J&K have been against the concept of continuation of the present political arrangement with the state of India... The sentiment for an independent homeland...seems to be the preferred majority choice.” Such aspirations are so deeply entrenched in the psyche of the masses that “the sentiment is the cause of the leader; the leader is not the cause of the sentiment”.

Whose nation is it?

This should not be construed as an impediment. Institutions, and even the well-meaning popular leaderships grow around the cause. The cause is paramount, not the leadership. To be fair with the concept of “achievable nationhood”, it is an earnest effort to put forward the ideas in line with the aspirations of the masses. And surprisingly, the author has not shied away from anchoring the document in the ideology of nationhood, though in a diluted form.

The concept of “shared sovereignty” in the document is an attempt to fill the gap between the actual situation in Kashmir and its perceptions among people outside the state. For a staunch adherent of the right-to-self-determination ideology, it is a substantial climbdown, and for a state yet to recognize the political aspiration of the people, it is an effort to assert its separate identity.

The paper makes a distinction between ‘grievances’ and ‘aspirations’. The State, at best, acknowledges the grievances, but not the aspirations of the people. Their sacrifices have cast a deep imprint on the minds of the masses, and resonate not only the will of the people but aspects of the resistance as well.

Even then, the State is indisposed to recognize the “struggle” or the “aspiration” of Kashmir. The present-day State apparatus does not believe in the ‘moral abstract’ anymore. It simply operates in the realm of the ‘realpolitik’. Sovereignty of the state is sacred. War or violence against the people is deemed as absolutely legitimate, as the modern State does not face the qualms of morally justifying its acts and omissions. Non-recognition of people’s aspirations is not the success of the state; but it reflects the failure of the people’s movement.

“Achievable nationhood” is just a theoretical construct; it will remain so, if it is not backed by an institutionalized effort. In the absence of a genuine political movement, the people will continue to suffer. The only way out of this quagmire is a non-violent struggle. But for this struggle to succeed, it has to maintain its innocence.