WHITE DEATH: RUSSIA’S WAR ON FINLAND, 1939-40 By Robert Edwards
Weidenfeld & Nicolson
£20

In November 1939, both the democratic Western powers and Nazi Germany were shocked when the Soviet Union invaded Finland. Hard-liners in France and Britain thought of attacking Russia. However, many decision-makers in London and Paris believed that Stalin’s invasion would provoke Hitler to attack Russia.But the Nazi-Soviet pact held. In White Death, Robert Edwards analyses the course, causes and consequences of the Russo-Finnish War.

Josef Stalin was paranoid despite his pact with Hitler. He attacked Finland in order to protect Leningard from a probable German attack. Hitler came under immense pressure from the German public and Benito Mussolini to defend Finland. But he informed Mussolini in a secret letter that Germany should secure its western borders first by attacking the Franco-British armies. The Eastern Question could be tackled afterwards. Officially, the Third Reich maintained a benevolent neutrality altough Hermann Göring secretly supplied arms to Finland through Sweden.

The British and French governments also came under public pressure to save the “innocent” Finns from the “axis of evil”. Initially, the French planned to bomb the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus from Syria. Later, the general staffs of Britain and France decided to send an expeditionary force to Scandinavia. However, the democratic governments hesitated to violate the territorial integrity of neutral Norway.

But, Winston Churchill came up with a plan to send British troops to capture the Swedish iron and nickel mines that supplied the arms industries of the Third Reich. Churchill assumed that once the Swedish mines were threatened, Hitler would be forced to intervene in Scandinavia. And the German intervention in Scandinavia would result in war between Germany and Russia.

Hitler did intervene and, in April 1940, sent troops to Norway. The Wehrmacht kicked out the British Expeditionary Force to occupy Norway. Realizing that Hitler meant business, Stalin did not occupy the Petsamo nickel mines. By mid-1940, Norway, Sweden and Finland had moved into the German orbit.

Edwards concludes that, in the long run, the Russo-Finnish War was a blessing in disguise for the Soviet Union. About one million Soviet soldiers were mobilized against Finland. However, for over three months, the under-equipped and numerically inferior Finnish forces held the Russian troops and inflicted heavy casualties on the Reds. The poor performance of the Red Army against Finland made Hitler decide that Russia would stand no chance against the mighty Wehrmacht.This would strongly influence the Führer in launching Operation Barba- rossa in the summer of 1941.

By contrast, the defeats in Finland forced the Bolshevik leaders to set their house in order. Stalin started reorganizing the Red Army and producing heavy artillery and tanks. A rejuvenated Red Army would withstand the blows inflicted by the Wehrmacht.

Since the Scandinavian role has remained at the margins of World War II literature, White Death was long overdue. The account is interesting and weaves together political, diplomatic and strategic aspects of the Russia-Finland War. The moral of the story is that in great power-politics, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of small countries do not matter.