The head of the largest economy of Asia met the head of the largest democracy of Asia. The meeting, according to the normal expectations of diplomacy, should have produced a series of agreements and treaties which would benefit both countries. Such expectations were belied. Agreements were signed to show the world that the visit was replete with goodwill and success. None of the agreements, however, is of any great pitch and moment. They are valuable more as gestures than as substantial achievements. The level of the agreements can be measured from the fact that there was one to send 500 students to China to encourage bilateral tourism. Similarly, an understanding to see if a new route can be opened to Manasarovar will not go down in the annals of Sino-Indian diplomacy as a great achievement. This is not to be gratuitously negative but it is an attempt to reveal how a non-visit was dressed up to be a visit.

The labelling of Mr Hu Jintao’s visit to India as a non-visit might raise a few eyebrows. But how else can it be described when it was hamstrung from the very beginning by fundamental contradictions emanating the economic interests of the two countries and from China’s stand on the Indo-US nuclear treaty. It is impossible to believe that Mr Hu Jintao and his mandarins were unaware of these problems. So the question that needs to be asked is, why did the Chinese president come to India? The answer lies in the special relationship that China has nurtured with Pakistan. Despite this special relationship, given the balance of power in south Asia, the Chinese president could not possibly visit only Pakistan and exclude India. That would be an alienating gesture so far New Delhi was concerned and would only revive old enmities. Mr Hu Jintao thus made a compromise. He came to India as a gesture of goodwill, signed many minor agreements and then moved on to Pakistan. New Delhi may not be too happy but the Chinese cannot be faulted on protocol.