The collapse of the peace initiative is a sad story for Assam. After many years there were faint hopes of an end to the state’s 27-year-long militancy. New Delhi had set the stage for a dialogue, which the rebels of the United Liberation Front of Asom were expected to eventually join. As a preliminary step, the Ulfa appointed a “people’s consultative committee” to negotiate with the Centre on its behalf. The government reciprocated the gesture by temporarily suspending the army’s counter-insurgency operations. If the Centre has now decided to resume the operations, it is clear that the peace moves had reached a dead end. The events leading to this failure suggest that the Ulfa is primarily to blame for it. The rebels clearly failed to give peace a chance. Even as its chosen representatives talked to the Centre, the outfit continued with its acts of violence and intimidation. The killing of a tea-garden owner by the Ulfa’s cadre last week was only the latest evidence of its complete disregard for the peace initiative. There had been many other incidents to suggest that the rebels were not serious about peace. This suspicion was strengthened by the fact that the Ulfa leaders had continued to ignore the Centre’s calls to join the peace talks directly. And this despite an assurance from the prime minister, Mr Manmohan Singh, himself that the government was prepared to discuss “all issues”.

However, the militants’ folly should not be allowed to completely hijack the peace process. Even as the army resumes the battle, it will do well to use restraint and caution. The militants can be pursued and fought better if the army can win the support of the common people. All charges of ‘excesses’ by the army in the North-East may not be true; but there have been cases when the jawans seemed to have acted unreasonably and thereby antagonized the common people. After all, the counter-insurgency operations are not just about ensuring the security of the state; they are primarily about ensuring peace and security for the people. The aim of these operations must be to so weaken the rebels that they are forced to make peace. The resumption of the army’s operations, therefore, should ideally be a means to an end. There can be no alternative to fresh efforts at peacemaking, despite the failures. Only this can be a government’s realistic strategy. The Naga peace talks make the same point.