Victoria’s War: The Rise of Empire
by Saul David,
Viking, £18

Britain emerged as the world’s sole superpower during the first half of the 19th century. Despite withdrawals from North America between 1837, the date of Victoria’s accession to the throne, and 1861, the British empire expanded from two to nine and a half million square miles. Most of the acquisitions were in Asia. Saul David, one of Britain’s most popular younger generation historians, portrays the various campaigns that Britain fought during this period in the volume under review.

Britain’s empire continued to expand even during the second half of the 19th century. But the scenario changed after 1861. First, most of the acquisitions took place in Africa rather than in Asia. The last few decades witnessed the emergence of other big powers like Germany, Russia and the United States of America. So, the expansion in Africa, unlike Asia before 1861, was a byproduct of rivalries among the European powers.

David covers the first 23 years of Queen Victoria’s reign. In a fast moving narrative based on the primary sources collected from the Oriental and India Office Collection and the National Army Museum, he charts the advance of British armaments in various corners of Asia. Most of the campaigns occurred in Punjab, Afghanistan, Persia, Burma and China. All the wars, except the 1857 mutiny, accepts David, were the products of aggression and display of power. He argues that British expansionism was not the result of a preconceived plan formulated at London, but happened due to the activities of the men stationed at those places. Charles Napier in Sind, during 1843, Elgin in China in 1857, and many others started aggressive wars without authorization from London and later presented the government with a fait accompli.

The colonial wars did not involve the expenditure of a vast amount of demographic and economic resources compared to the inter-state wars of 19th-century Europe. Despite possessing numerical superiority, the Asians were repeatedly defeated by the Redcoats. David cites tactical, technological and managerial superiority as the reasons for continued British success. During the two opium wars (1839-42, 1856-60), the Chinese coastal forts were blasted by heavy guns of the Royal navy. The Manchu banner armies were scattered by the British regimental field guns. In 1857, the Enfield rifles provided an edge to the British in their war against the mutineers. Officer training and the unity of command in contrast with the divided leadership of the rebels sounded the death knell of the mutiny in India. David’s portrayal of British expansionism, at times, degenerates into the old ‘blood and guts’ sort of military history.

Many will find fault with this triumphalist version of British military imperialism. Strangely, David gives the lion’s share of attention to the British units, although the sepoy army was the principal workhorse of the British overseas army. This is partly because he depends on the sources generated by the British military personnel. Finally, David’s acceptance of the old Cambridge School thesis that the British Empire was acquired in a fit of absentmindedness will raise objections from many. To sum up, David ought to be praised for writing a lively, readable, semi-academic account of British imperialism at its height. Victoria’s War will act as a primer for further studies in the field.