June has been a happening month in the North-east. A rift in the Congress ushered in a new chief minister in Meghalaya. Peace talks pertaining to militant outfits in Assam and Nagaland received an impetus. Manipur witnessed renewed turbulence with blockades and protests, while Mizoram, quite unobtrusively, celebrated a remarkable 20 years of truce on June 30.

Indeed, when the Mizos celebrated the anniversary of Remna Ni (Peace Accord Day) last Friday, they were reiterating the principles of what conflict managers call ?strategic design of peacebuilding?. Like the basics of journalism, it uses the framework of ?what, who, when, where and how? to analyse each case. Symbolic dates, such as the one in Mizoram last week, fall under the strategic ?when? category.

The jubilation is justified because the genesis of the Mizoram accord was far from uneventful. Not only was it preceded by 20 years of intractable insurgency, it was also made possible by an elected chief minister, Lalthanhawla of the Congress, stepping aside so that Laldenga, the firebrand leader of the Mizo National Front, could take his place. That the 20th anniversary of this occasion should take place under the chief ministership of Zoramthanga, Laldenga?s closest aide in the days of jungle warfare, is surely remarkable.

Dialogue is on for similar peace accords in Nagaland and Assam, but it is impossible, given the present scenario, to envisage that a gesture like Lalthanhawla?s in 1986 will be made by the chief ministers of these states. In the multi-ethnic environment, negotiation assumes a far more complex dimension.

There is no one panacea to promote the peace dialogue. For instance, in spite of Delhi?s regular ceasefire-extension manoeuvres with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), little has been achieved in nearly a decade.

In fact, the NSCN (I-M) general secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah, clarified on June 30 that despite the increased frequency in peace talks, his organization still looks at India as a ?friendly neighbour?. ?What we have been proposing is that Nagalim and India should become a federation,? he maintained. After talks in Bangkok and Amsterdam, negotiations were held in the Hague in end-June. Several ?outside facilitators,? like Michael Van Walt van Praag, have participated in the efforts over the past couple of meetings. Praag, a longtime friend of Muivah?s and executive president of the Hague-based NGO Kreddha, is also the former general secretary of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Acronymed UNPO, many of its members, of various ethnicities, tout the notion of an United Nations affiliation, which is incorrect.

Given these credentials and India?s known reluctance towards ?external interference,? Delhi?s acceptance of a Dutch mediator is nothing short of astounding. Praag?s endeavour notwithstanding, one wonders what the next round of talks in Bangkok this month will achieve.

Those familiar with the Naga imbroglio realize that an intelligent analysis would inevitably lead to a dead end, with neither side willing to change its approach. Peacebuilders often speak glibly of the ?Nagaland case study?; their knowledge is gleaned from a well-orchestrated campaign and internet propaganda. The Naga leaders have sought to exert pressure on India by drumming up support for their cause in several countries, including China and Britain. They even attended the recent Bougainville peace conference anniversary gathering and highlighted the similarities between their situation and that of Papua New Guinea.

It would be worth mentioning that Manipur ? Nagaland?s most restive neighbour when it comes to the quest for Nagalim or Greater Nagaland (a demand that tops the NSCN agenda) ? also draws a parallel with Papua New Guinea and East Timor when highlighting its plight under ?Indian colonizers?. The Bougainville peace process, which relates to the Papuans? struggle for independence, focused on autonomy, amnesty and pardon for persons involved in crisis-related activities and helping the inhabitants break away from Australian and Indonesian control. That this is suddenly in the limelight highlights the desperation with which the facilitators of the peace process in Nagaland, Assam and Manipur are seeking model guidelines to propel a moribund exercise forward.

In Assam, the People?s Consultative Group, comprising civilians appointed by the United Liberation Front of Asom to negotiate with the Centre on its behalf, has succeeded in clearing the decks for negotiations with the banned outfit. Given the series of killer blasts that rocked Assam on the eve of last month?s talks, it is remarkable that the PCG managed a breakthrough, thereby preventing the dialogue from dissipating into mere rhetoric. But there has been no hint of flexibility on the part of the banned outfit. In the latest edition of its mouthpiece, Freedom, the Ulfa linked truce deliberations with suspension of counter-insurgency operations, and said that the onus was on the government to initiate ?direct talks? with the outfit on what it termed the ?Indo-Assam conflict?. Yet, realizing how much the outfit has antagonized the people of Assam, Pradip Gogoi, the Ulfa leader, said last week that the outfit was sorry if it had committed any wrong against the state. The operative term, of course, is the loaded ?if?.

The gesture is still significant, given the importance conflict transformation mechanisms accord to ?restorative justice?. Just as the Naga Hoho, the apex body of Naga groups tried a few months back, the process of reconciliation ? between factions of rival militant groups or between tribes or between the insurgents and civil society ? is inevitably a precursor to closing the door on a violence?smeared past.

Ron Claassen, restorative justice practitioner, offers three guiding principles for such situations. First, the ?wrong? or injustice must be acknowledged. Second, equity (between offender and victim) needs to be restored and finally, future intentions addressed. It is the last that usually proves to be a stumbling block when groups like the NSCN and Ulfa spout the ?sovereignty? demand. The coming weeks, therefore, are likely to unfold quite dramatically. While the NSCN and Ulfa leaders set their terms on the negotiating table, the Centre?s facilitators will need to be more proactive.

All the northeastern states brazenly attribute their lack of development and failure in governance to the climate of insurgency. But in all these years, what have Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Meghalaya done to weed out rampant corruption and double taxation (the latter going into the militant kitty)?

The recent farce in Meghalaya, where D.D. Lapang grovelled before rival Purno Sangma to bail him out when his chief-ministership was at stake, is a case in point. Even after being replaced by J.D. Rymbai, Lapang continues to enjoy ?all the facilities of a chief minister?. In a state where a former assembly speaker opted out of his prestigious post because it was ?not profitable enough?, this comes as no surprise. Till these state governments become accountable, insurgency will remain a cottage industry and peace talks a platitude for bi-monthly junkets to foreign destinations.