Commenting on the meeting of the Indian foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, with the US under-secretary of state, Nicholas Burns, in London, the US state department made a rather strange statement. Briefing the press in Washington DC, its spokesperson, Sean McCormack, said: ?I think they were able to tie up a couple of loose ends concerning things that the Indian government owed the US in order to really move forward on this deal.?

For the spokesperson to say that India ?owed? the US certain things could just be a matter of style of spoken English. But ?owed? could also imply that India had made certain commitments that it had not fulfilled up to the London meeting. These, presumably, would either have to be over and above what New Delhi had already done to push the deal forward or defining the nature and specificities of the existing commitments in a manner acceptable to the US.

In keeping with the spirit of the July 18 joint statement, New Delhi took several specific steps. The prime minister, Manmohan Singh, gave a commitment in parliament about the voluntary separation of the civilian and nuclear facilities. Subsequently, he placed the separation plan and its sequencing in the house. India also brought its export control laws in consonance with the missile technology control regime and the nuclear suppliers group guidelines. It also began negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency for India-specific safeguards. In addition, India reiterated its commitment to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and to work with Washington on the fissile material cut-off treaty. These measures were part of India?s obligations to facilitate civilian nuclear cooperation with America. But this was clearly not sufficient.

What then could the US be referring to? One can only hazard a guess. Perhaps the Americans wanted India to give binding commitments on two areas ? the question of moratorium on nuclear tests and halting the production of fissile material, and push the nature of the India-specific safeguards being negotiated with the IAEA in a direction acceptable to them. It could be argued that after having come such a long way, why lose everything because of semantics? No one is going to conduct nuclear tests now, so India is not being tied down to anything more than what it has already committed.

As for halting fissile material production, there is an argument that India has sufficient stock; that instead of a grand vision of an Indian nuclear deterrent, it is better to adhere to the notion of a minimum nuclear deterrent. And, in any case, the nuclear plants available outside safeguards give India enough leeway to produce additional fissile material.

However, the July 18 agreement was clear that in return for fulfilling the obligations listed, India would enjoy the ?same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US.? This was an indirect way of saying that India would have the rights and obligations of a nuclear weapons state.

It did not mean that the US, through domestic legislation, would seek to impose ?CTBT Plus? on India. If India had signed the comprehensive test ban treaty ? which it did not ? then it would be able to use the ?national security clause? allowing resumption of nuclear tests under certain conditions. A bilateral no-testing obligation will remove this option. Similarly, it did not mean that the Indian commitment to work with the US on a multilateral FMCT could be converted into a bilateral or regional fissile material cut-off.

The US wants to convert India?s unilateral moratorium on testing into something that is legally binding in its bilateral agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. This is being suggested even when there already exist US Congressional laws triggering sanctions against those who conduct nuclear tests. So, New Delhi?s question is: Why make no-testing an India-specific legal obligation? It is possible that in the counter-draft of the bilateral agreement handed over by Saran to Burns in London, mutually acceptable language has been found on this count. Perhaps this was one of the things ?owed? and delivered.

The Bush administration would like to tell Congress that it is working on India on halting fissile material production. If India had thought that the multilateral process of negotiating the FMCT would take years ? giving New Delhi time to stockpile the fissile material ? then this was a misreading of the American mind.

On May 18, in a surprise move, the US moved a draft FMCT in the conference on disarmament at Geneva. This draft will enter into force immediately after the five nuclear weapons powers ratify it. India does not get the chance because it is not a recognized nuclear weapons power. Except China, the other four have excess of fissile material. China, however, is linking FMCT to the US agreeing to set up an ad hoc group on non-weaponization of space. But if China also agrees to the US FMCT draft, then India would be cornered.

India?s position on FMCT was that it must be non-discriminatory; multilateral; and internationally and effectively verifiable. However, barely hours after the US introduced its FMCT draft without verification provisions, India made another statement, suggesting that it was willing to work with the US draft. The idea perhaps was not to be seen to be opposing the US draft on FMCT in deference to the US Congress even if it did not allow for international verification.

The third area of US concern has been the India-specific safeguards being negotiated with the IAEA. India would want the safeguards to minimize intrusiveness, while the US may want the opposite. Has New Delhi now gone close to what the US wanted and is this what it ?owed? the US?

Could it be that at the end of the day, the US has succeeded in patiently and methodically capping India?s strategic programme? Perhaps not wishing to upset America, New Delhi also decided not to test the long-range nuclear capable Agni-III missile.

It seems possible then that in negotiating the nuclear deal, the US has not only limited India?s nuclear weapons programme but also its delivery capability. If that is the case, then Washington would have used Congressional action as a powerful tool to force India to do its bidding.