The Idea of Pakistan By Stephen Philip Cohen, Oxford, Rs 495

In the new millennium, the American state department has categorized south Asia as a potential flashpoint of nuclear war. For American strategists, Pakistan is going to be the most serious foreign policy problem in the near future. This is partly because some eminent Indian policy analysts are arguing that New Delhi is going to be the US?s greatest strategic partner within Asia in the coming future. Stephen Philip Cohen, the US?s foremost south Asia expert, analyzes the nature of the Pakistani state and the US?s options towards Islamabad.

Cohen shows how the internal dynamics of Pakistani society is shaping Islamabad?s external behaviour towards the neighbouring countries. There is some truth in the oft-repeated assertion that Pakistan stands for three A?s, which represent Allah, Army and America. The Islamic parties are growing more and more powerful. A sort of primitive Wahabism is gaining ground even among the middle classes. At present, the Islamic parties are governing two provinces. Second, the army has been in charge of Pakistan for most of the time since 1947. Third, the US remains Pakistan?s principal patron, in spite of some ups and downs.

Cohen feels that it is too early so say that Pakistan is a failed state. In the last five decades, it has survived several crises, and it remains valuable to the US to maintain stability in the subcontinent. To prevent Pakistan from going down the slippery road of decline, the American government needs to take certain steps which would constitute a carrot-and-stick policy.

According to Cohen, the Pakistan army, which forms the chief pillar of Pakistani ?establishment?, prefers a no-change policy ? since its power, prestige and status are well-protected in the present scenario. Moreover, the Pakistani army, like most military organizations of the world, is conservative in nature. Cohen is probably influenced by Barry Posen?s theory that military policies change when kicked by the political elite. But, in case of Pakistan, the politicians are too weak to stand up for themselves, let alone forcing the army to make a policy shift. So, the US has to take the responsibility of doing the job for them.

Pakistan cannot survive without economic aid from the US. So, suggests Cohen, certain strings should be attached to the US aid package to Pakistan. The foremost objective of the US would be to force the Pakistan army to restore democracy fast ? maybe not a true democracy, but a sort of controlled democracy under moderate politicians backed up by the army. Instead of encouraging Pakistan to buy F-16s, the US government should put pressure on the Pakistani establishment to spend more on health and education. The spread of secular education could put a check on the dissemination of Islamist propaganda, which has influenced the lower middle classes in the countryside and small towns.

Cohen?s analysis is quite realistic because unlike the hawks, he does not suggest a radical rollback of Pakistan?s nuclear programme. Cohen suggests that Washington should attempt to prevent further expansion of the Pak nuclear arsenal. Any cutback of aid and Western contact would hurt the superpower more than the citizens of Pakistan. Part descriptive and part prescriptive, Cohen?s book is a must read for all those interested in contemporary South Asian affairs.