After taking the surprising step of voting at the International Atomic Energy Agency in favour of referring Iran to the United Nations security council, India appears to be gearing up to adhere to this position at the IAEA?s November meeting, despite the mounting opposition within the country. At the very least, the Indian decision exhibits a serious paucity of strategic thinking and diplomatic skill within the prime minister?s office and the ministry of external affairs. Many have commented on the motives behind the Indian vote, but what is required now are intelligent suggestions on possible solutions. This article is an attempt to examine certain relevant and related facts which point towards a possible initial approach to resolve the problem.

Much of the current allegations against Iran is baseless. The major difference of opinion which persists between Iran and the Western nations is about whether Iran can be permitted to have uranium enrichment facilities of its own for producing low-enriched uranium for power-reactor fuelling. If Iran is to have control of its low-enriched uranium supply, the only thing the world needs to ensure is that it does not lead to a diversion of that material for subsequent upgradation and use in a nuclear weapons programme, in Iran or outside.

In October 2003, Mohamed El-Baradei, director general of the IAEA, had made the following proposal in an article in The Economist, ?It is time to limit the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment, by agreeing to restrict these operations exclusively to facilities under multinational control...Such a framework should be inclusive: nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states, and those outside the current non-proliferation regime should all have a seat at the table.?

Subsequently, the IAEA formed an international group of experts to consider the possible multilateral approaches to the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. This group on Multilateral Nuclear Approaches under Bruno Pellaud, submitted a comprehensive report to the IAEA in February 2005. One of the five approaches suggested in its findings is ?creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management for facilities such as uranium enrichment, reprocessing.?

The earliest mention of multilateral management of sensitive nuclear operations dates back to the Baruch Plan presented to the UN in 1946. The IAEA, ever since its creation in 1957, continued to be interested in this approach. As early as in 1972, two separate multilateral uranium-enrichment consortia ? the Urenco and the Eurodif ? were formed. Eurodif runs a single facility in France, but has five countries investing and managing it. Urenco has three participating nations, with one facility in each country.

Ironically, in 1975, Iran was accepted as a partner in EURODIF, and it paid one billion dollars to buy a 10 per cent share of the ownership. But, after the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran was not given any enriched uranium, nor did it get back its investment from Eurodif.

In his address to the UN on September 17, 2005, the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said, ?Peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition. Nuclear power plants can indeed lead to total dependence of countries and peoples if they need to rely for their fuel on coercive (external) powers... No popularly elected and responsible government can consider such a situation in the interest of its people.? In today?s circumstances especially, the words of the Iranian president apply equally to India. India must desist from importing foreign nuclear reactors unless it also has multilaterally-assured fuel-supply arrangements for the 40-50 year lifetime of such reactors. In the light of this, MNAs become equally vital for India, even if the present Indo-US cooperation deal is approved.

The Iranian president also made a constructive proposal in his speech, on the basis of which India and the international community must attempt to construct a viable solution that is acceptable to all. He said, ?As a further confidence building measure and in order to provide the greatest degree of transparency, Iran is prepared to engage in serious partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment program in Iran.?

In view of the above, I would urge the government of India to seriously consider the following approach, with appropriate modifications if need be, for immediate implementation:

One, India should consider initiating and participating in the setting up and operation of a regional uranium enrichment facility, to be built in Iran with joint financial investments and collective management by a consortium consisting of India, Iran, Russia and South Africa. An appropriate enrichment plant supplier may be identified by the consortia and suitable terms and conditions for setting up an enrichment plant finalized in consultation with the director-general of the IAEA.

Once the plans for constructing the RUEF are finalized, Iran must dismantle all its national uranium enrichment facilities and associated developmental programmes. The governing board of the RUEF must consist of representatives of the consortium countries and a senior nominee of the IAEA. All facilities and operations of the RUEF must be subject to IAEA safeguards and its Additional Protocol. While the plant must be operated and maintained mostly by personnel from the consortium nations, the required training and provision of spare-parts and services must be assured by the supplier under a long-term contract.

Two, India must immediately start consultations with Iran, Russia and South Africa to first get their concurrence in principle for this approach. Next, jointly with these partners, India must take the lead in seeking the support for this idea from the nonaligned countries, China and others in the IAEA board. Only after ensuring a wide enough support base from all these quarters should India and the consortium partners open a formal dialogue with the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and Germany to get their concurrence.

Whether or not their concurrence is forthcoming, India should introduce a suitable resolution, co-sponsored by the consortium partners, at the November 2005 meeting of the IAEA board. This resolution should seek the minimum time required to prepare the details of such a consortium for subsequent placement before the board. Simultaneously, the Indian resolution should also seek the postponement of any referral of Iran to the UN security council until after discussions are held on the detailed proposal of the consortium. In the interim, Iran must simultaneously agree to return to the Additional-Protocol provisions and not to initiate any activities towards enrichment, or the construction of its heavy-water reactor or reprocessing test facilities.

With the above move, India could regain lost ground on Iran and earn back the respect it lost internationally owing to its recent actions. Whether or not the US agrees to the above move, India must present the resolution at the IAEA and not surrender its right to pursue an independent foreign policy once again.