No rational person can argue that the United States of America?s desire for improving ties with India should be spurned. Given the position of the US in the world today, any negative posturing on this count would be seen as an opportunity missed.

Entering into a ten-year framework on defence cooperation with the US is a politically useful step and will have beneficial diplomatic fallout. It will give India a greater international profile.

In our immediate neighbourhood, the deepening of Indo-US ties will act as a cautionary factor for China and Pakistan in dealing with India. In relation to both, the agreement with the US for joint production of defence equipment, arms and supply of dual-use technology would be of considerable advantage to India.

However, revelations of the Nixon-Kissinger conversations about Indians being ?bastards? and Indira Gandhi a ?witch? have served to underline the wide chasm between US rhetoric and reality. George W. Bush quoting Indira Gandhi approvingly a day after these revelations must not fool Indians into believing that the gap between American rhetoric and reality has necessarily been filled since the Seventies. It is better to be Indian ?bastards? looking after Indian interests than being the go-go girls of Pax Americana, kicking up your legs with every twitch in Uncle Sam?s face. It is all the more necessary, therefore, to recognize US motivations in trying to get India into a close embrace.

It is not the love of India that brings the Americans to Asia. After World War II, for the first time the US is physically present on the ground in our neighbourhood. Apart from being in Pakistan, it is now permanently based in Afghanistan and in central Asia. Its interests in the region go beyond fighting terrorism and have a larger geo-political basis.

Pakistan is pivotal to US designs in Afghanistan and central Asia and the Americans are there for good. It is natural that they should want to remove any un- predictability in India-Pakistan relations. Moreover, if they sell arms to India, its capacity to protest arms supplies to Pakistan will be eroded. It would become easier for the US to sell arms to Pakistan.

But it is also a fact that while Europe is by and large at peace today, Asia is still a cauldron. It is the emerging theatre of superpower competition. US interest in India is also aimed at keeping a check on China with which it may be headed for a major economic confrontation in the next decade. The Chinese hold over the US economy is not insubstantial, with China even making a bid for taking over the US oil and gas giant Unocal. It is the geo-political consideration of Asia, and the potential role of China, that has turned US attention to India.

At present, the US does not enjoy any effective leverage over New Delhi. India is not a recipient of US aid, there are no defence ties worth the name and currently it is under US sanctions for going overtly nuclear. Trade does not give the US sufficient leverage because Indian trade with other regions of the world is also growing.

If India decides to buy big-ticket defence items from the US, then Washington gets the crucial leverage over India that has been missing up to now. With Indian defence purchases, US arms manufacturers get a large buyer, while India?s long-standing and reliable defence cooperation with Russia gets diluted.

There are other collateral advantages for the US. The deeper the US defence relationship with India, the more New Delhi would have to look over its shoulder to see that nothing happens which might trigger off US legal mechanisms for censure or sanctions. These developments do not have to be defence-related either. Already the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline venture has become risky because under US law any green-field investment in Iran can invite sanctions.

New Delhi cannot afford to forget its past experience of purchasing US equipment. After the nuclear tests of May 1998, Harrier jets ordered from Britain were grounded because they contained US parts. The US walked out of Tarapore after having supplied the nuclear reactor and left India high and dry in the collaborative light combat aircraft project. From the Indian point of view, any collaboration with the US can turn into a high risk venture because one does not know under what circumstances and at what time, US legal mechanisms would kick in to stop the venture.

Joint production or co-production is often thought of as a means of reducing such unpredictability in a relationship. The US is making this proposition to India for the first time. However, co-production can be a deceptive term when technical capabilities of the two sides are grossly mismatched. India has not been able to produce a single aircraft engine despite decades of effort ? Cauvery engine for the LCA is only now being tested in Russia.

India has a co-production agreement with Russia for Sukhoi-30 aircraft and T-90 tanks. But all the critical parts are supplied by Russia. In these conditions, co-production becomes a ploy to fool gullible public opinion ? suggesting that a lot more is on offer than there really is.

Buying from America for the Indian armed forces would mean additional problems of inventory management because of diversification. Disparate facilities and maintenance groups would have to be set up which would raise costs. It would involve giving up on commonalities and transferability in technology and equipment.

However, the real test of US intentions towards India will come on three issues: what kind of cutting-edge dual-use technology is Washington willing to supply to India because of a direct defence relationship and how soon; whether George W. Bush is willing to expend political capital with the US Congress to supply civilian nuclear technology to India; and whether the US is willing to treat India as a de facto nuclear power which has behaved responsibly and is not a proliferator and should, therefore, be admitted to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The rest, including a non-veto seat in the United Nations security council, are peripheral concerns.

Meanwhile, one should keep in mind that on larger strategic issues, the debate between India and the US is far from over. Irrespective of the merits of the case, the defence agreement can become an instrument to pressure India on the development and expansion of its nuclear deterrent.

India also has to be mindful of the extent of convergence and mismatch between its policies and those of the US. There is a difference between them in their approach to Iraq; west Asia; UN reforms; out-of-area operations of Nato as in Afghanistan and central Asia; the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the use of sanctions; and over America?s simplistic understanding of Islamic terrorism and somewhat brutal and insensitive ways of fighting it.

Unless this gap narrows, there are bound to be problems in the relationship. There are lessons to be learnt from the way its long-term ally, Germany, was dropped as the favoured candidate of the US for the UN security council seat after it expressed differences over Iraq. India might yet come to grief for assuming permanence in the arranged marriage being proposed.