The powers of a state may not mean much unless it knows how to use them. That seems to be at the heart of the government?s failure to tackle the Maoist rebellion in many parts of the country. The absence of a holistic policy in the matter was exposed once again by the recent Maoist rampage in Bihar. Worse, even after the mayhem, New Delhi does not appear to have recognized the enormity of its failures. This was evident in the Union home ministry?s belated and rather cursory response to the event. Days after the incident, the governments at the Centre and in Bihar showed little signs of a coordinated campaign against the Maoists. Instead, contradictory statements emanated from New Delhi and Patna on whether the Maoists of Nepal had been behind it. This sounds like a familiar ploy to cover up administrative failures. That the Nepalese rebels have links with their Indian counterparts in several states has long been an open secret. To highlight the Nepal connection, therefore, does nothing to lessen the burden of intelligence and administrative incompetence.

The problem is that the government?s strategy against the Maoists is plagued by politics. The worst evidence of this comes from Andhra Pradesh, where the rebels are the strongest in India. The fight against them is always undercut by narrow interests of local politics. This has been so irrespective of what party or coalition rules in Hyderabad. The Maoists cynically exploit such a situation, walking into and out of the peace talks at will. And, while the governments dither, the rebels use the talks to regroup, re-arm and relaunch fresh offensives. The need, therefore, is to see the Maoist menace for what it essentially is ? a major threat to the country?s internal security. As such, the battle against it must be delinked from political considerations. The larger need, of course, is for a precise and cohesive policy. The Centre and the affected states must jointly frame this policy and work together to implement it. Since the rebels from Nepal have close links with those in India, New Delhi cannot afford not to take the former into confidence on this campaign. True, there have been committees to deal with the problem. But the government seems to be unable to make up its mind on how far it should go to put down the rebellion. If this indecision persists, the Maoist threat will go from bad to worse.