I think it?s important that you really have a feel for the (US) strategy across India, Pakistan and Afghanistan ?I?m going to do a little bit of a tick-tock, a sort of how-we-got-here and where-we-are. ? Senior administration official at the US department of state, Washington DC

Following the trip of the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, to south Asia last month, the US department of state chose to capitalize on the emerging d?tente in India-Pakistan relations with a briefing last week, focussed on a ?broader conceptual framework as a strategy? for south Asia.

This came immediately after the announcement about the president of the United States of America, George W. Bush, authorizing the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. ?The challenge?, said one US official, asked about the wisdom of the deal likely to trigger a subcontinental arms race, ?is how to embed the question of whether you sell F-16s to Pakistan in a broader conception of what we want to do with Pakistan, but also what we want to do with India?.

Rice had outlined to the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, the three-pronged dialogues envisaged by the US: strategic (where the sale of multi-role combat aircraft will feature), energy (civil, nuclear and nuclear-safety issues), and economic (revitalizing the energy and trade talks with commerce, finance and environment). Singh asserted last week that India ?will take a hard look at the US offer of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy as well as Washington?s willingness to sell F-16s.? The national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan, too, said India recognized these gestures as a ?positive step.?

However, at the state department briefing, officials were clueless about the details of the aircraft deals or the economic impact on the US. ?I don?t have a figure?, said one, while another senior official joked, ?I think it would be best to go to the companies concerned and ask them to talk about the economy of the Dallas Fort Worth region?.

When asked about the source of the US?s faith in the permanence of an Indo-Pak rapprochement, the officials said, ?the people of the region are telling us this...that the thaw is at a point that they have not experienced in their professional lives?.

It is this dependence on rarely verified statements that has the propaganda machinery working overtime in the US. It is not just the non-resident Asians who formulate opinions about this region?s growing strategic relationship with the Americans, but the policy circles too ? on whether the Bush administration?s recent moves are a tacit acceptance of a nuclear region, in spite of US law banning countries that have not signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty from buying sensitive ?dual use? (for civil and military purposes) technology.

This grey area in US policy has spawned an insidious network which percolates down the academia, media and even those sent on ?spotlighting? missions. Therefore, Americans saw documentaries on Godhra (by Indian filmmakers and students) and demonized the Gujarat chief minister, Narendra Modi, months before the visa fiasco. Bracketing Bush with Modi in the anti-Islam context serves no purpose because of their vastly-varying de-humanizing quotients. But the tendency to stereotype is still predominant in the US, as also ignorance and the disinterest to follow-up facts.

Take, for instance, the iftar dinner hosted by the former secretary of state, Colin Powell, for Fulbright fellows in December. In the zeal to appease west Asia, the Jewish scholar from Israel was invited, while those from Indonesia and Pakistan, the two most populous Muslim countries, were left out. Superficial fieldwork is evident even in relief campaigns and USAID projects. After the tsunami, US Marines were despatched to Sri Lanka, fuelling resentment and suspicions about ?unholy motives? in its people. When India said it could cope with the disaster without international donations, this was seen as an expression of supercilious attitude.

In the case of humanitarian projects of US agencies, a team spends minimal time (perhaps three weeks) in a totally alien territory, be it Somalia or Nepal, and draws up projects worth billions of dollars. Next, the same paradigm is transferred to an entirely different geographical location, with no consideration of socio-cultural or ethno-economic differences. The consequences are often disastrous.

Similarly with Kashmir. When the White House press secretary, Scott McClellan, said last Wednesday that ?there have been some positive steps moving forward on reducing tensions in the region?, he was guardedly optimistic about the confluence of motives behind the thaw. That Kashmir may figure in the upcoming bilateral talks became evident when Manmohan Singh said he would discuss ?all issues? with the Pakistani president when he visits New Delhi this month.

But while policy-makers and analysts debate the role of the US and the international community as ?crisis managers? in Kashmir, very few have objectively studied the genesis of the conflict or the ground reality today. At a recent simulation on the Kashmir scenario at a US university, there was a role earmarked for a ?Kashmir ambassador,? along with the Indian and Pakistani counterparts. Most American students in the class believed Kashmir was an independent country being fought over by its neighbours. The professor moderating the sequence was surprised when I pointed out this discrepancy.

At another venue, secessionist movements in the North-east had been portrayed so effectively that the ?chosen trauma? of its people overshadowed the reality. Some of the states were projected as ?countries located between India and Myanmar? where ?Indian security forces have unleashed a reign of terror.? Even the UN is now being petitioned by such activists to ?send forces to crush Indian hegemony.? On India?s soil, to boot!

Given these circumstances, troubleshooting endeavours aside, India needs to address the popular notion that there are contradictions in what we say and what we do. This gained ground during the Kargil war, when India, while adhering to the Shimla Agreement, resisted overtures on international intervention but welcomed US pressure on Pakistan to withdraw. Till the American policymakers are holistically educated on core issues of engagement and the concomitant progress made in this sphere, ?tick-tocking? on south Asian realpolitik will prevail. This, in turn, will add grist to the propaganda mill, and play into the hands of vested interests ? to sensationalize separatist aspirations and realize an agenda far removed from national interests.