On February 2, we are likely to witness the beginning of a substantive and sustained dialogue for peace with the Nagas. The expectations from the dialogue are high but its success depends almost entirely on the attitude of New Delhi. There are likely to be three major obstacles to successful negotiations with the Nagas: the attitude of those directing the peace process on behalf of Delhi ? especially to federal relationships; sticking to impractical bottom-lines; and not learning from the Congress party?s own history on dealing with the Nagas.

The untimely demise of J.N. Dixit, and the exit of Ajit Doval as the intelligence chief of the country by the time the talks begin, could prove to be a setback to the peace process. Institutional memories and mechanisms in India are weak and, therefore, the role of individuals assumes exaggerated importance. Dixit viewed the Naga issue in a political perspective and was liberal in his approach to settling insurgencies. In his short tenure, Doval had developed an excellent relationship of trust with the Naga leadership. The Naga leaders saw in him someone who was not interested in doing them down but was genuinely keen to settle the dispute. With his exit, they will lose a guiding hand.

If those directing the Naga peace talks now continue with the openness of mind required, there may be nothing to worry. Any reversion to a hard line, no-concessions approach is likely to be counter-productive. If we have policy-makers who believe that India made a mistake in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 by agreeing to a special status for the state, then they cannot resolve the Naga issue.

A flexible approach to the Naga negotiations and recognizing the immense possibilities of Indian federalism could become a model for settling other northeastern insurgencies. One must not, therefore, try to tire out the Nagas through prolonged negotiations and to beat them down hoping that eventually they would settle for something acceptable to New Delhi.

The Nagas are not politically na?ve and cannot be easily fooled. There is no point, therefore, in arguing that the negotiations must begin with the easier subjects first. Some initial understanding can, of course, have a positive impact on more intractable issues in the subsequent negotiations. However, if there is no understanding on issues of crucial importance to the Nagas, then agreement on peripheral subjects is meaningless.

It is imperative, therefore, that the Nagas be assured that whatever the ultimate contours of their relationship with India, there would be institutional mechanisms to protect their distinct identity.

They must also understand that a close relationship can be forged with them, based on a mutually acceptable division of competencies ? that is, a division of the subjects of governance by re-allocating the sub- jects that would be under the purview of the Central and state governments and those that would be governed jointly.

At one extreme, this might mean that the Centre would only keep with it key subjects like external affairs, defence, currency and communication ? the rest could go to the state. If there are Naga interests to be protected which impinge on foreign policy, then the state would naturally have to be consulted; for instance, the rationalization of boundary with Myanmar along areas that have Naga population. Similarly, it might be worthwhile to explore whether the state?s interests may also be affected by the Centre?s policy on defence or communications.

One common refrain in New Delhi is that the Naga demand for integration of territories cannot be conceded. This is a stupid slogan which people love to repeat unthinkingly. If anyone believes that Naga peace can be achieved without accepting, even if in principle at this stage, the desire of all Nagas to live together in a single administrative unit, then New Delhi can forget about peace. The Nagas living in the area contiguous with Nagaland will have to be given a time-bound process to decide whether they want to live together or whether they are happy where they are.

The United Progressive Alliance government works, however, through a mechanism of lowest common consensus. It has committed itself in its common minimum programme to not changing the boundaries of the north-eastern states. Narrow political interests have managed to tie the government?s hands down even before negotiations began with the Nagas.

The constitution of a second states? re-organization commission can provide the process by which not only the Nagas outside Nagaland but also the other ethnic groups and states which might be affected by the integration of Naga areas can argue their case. Such a commission must be time-bound and its tenure must not exceed two to three years. This is the only democratic way of taking decisions. It is also a way out of the present impasse.

Most importantly, there would have to be a transitional agreement that would usher in an interim government into power. This transitional agreement in effect would be an instrumentality for implementing the final Naga settlement.

Only when some broad understanding is reached on these crucial issues can negotiations on other subjects make any sense. Indian negotiators may claim that there are no roadmaps for dealing with such situations, but vibrant democracies make their own roadmaps.

Yet, the government would do well to delve into its institutional history of dealing with the Nagas. It might like, for example, to refer to the final round of negotiations between the then prime minister, Indira Gandhi, and the Naga delegation led by Kughato Sema ? which included Isak Swu, the current chairman of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah). This was the culmination of a peace process initiated by Jawaharlal Nehru before his death.

Indira Gandhi had told the Nagas that she was willing to settle all differences on the basis of friendship and unity with India. In the last meeting of the Naga leaders with Indira Gandhi on January 2, 1967, the Indian prime minister told them that if they left key subjects like defence, external affairs, currency and communications entirely to the Central government, she would be happy to leave the governance of other subjects entirely to the state.

The meeting with Indira Gandhi was followed by a more detailed discussion. Indira Gandhi?s external affairs minister, Dinesh Singh, home secretary L.P. Singh, external affairs secretary T.N. Kaul and joint secretary to the prime minister, S. Bannerjee represented the Indian side. From the Naga side, Z. Ramyo, Zashie Huire and Megamato Angami participated in discussing the division of subjects in the Union list, the state list and the concurrent list of the Constitution.

Surely the minutes of these meetings would be available in the archives of the ministry of external affairs that handled Naga affairs at that time. Our present policy pundits may be able to learn a thing or two from them. Some Nagas, including Thuingaleng Muivah, the general secretary of the NSCN(I-M), blame factionalism within the underground for rejecting the proposals made by Indira Gandhi in 1967. However, today there is an opportunity for the government of India led by a Congress prime minister to revive the Indira Gandhi proposals instead of listening to overly cautious advice about the disastrous consequences of re-negotiating division of competencies.