Thuingaleng Muivah, the general secretary of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) is given to saying, ?Peace does not come knocking at your door often.? With his visit along with the chairman of the organization, Isak Chishi Swu, peace has coming knocking at our doors once again. This time the opportunity should not be missed.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Govind Ballabh Pant and the then Congress president, U.N. Dhebar, missed it when a Naga member of parliament from Outer Manipur, Rungsung Suisa, went to them with a solution. He had proposed a federated relationship with key competencies being shared with the Centre and the rest being with the Nagas. Suisa claimed that the Congress leaders had been convinced by him, but unfortunately, nothing came of it.

Naga legend has it that Suisa later went to Indira Gandhi when she became prime minister and asked her what her primary concern vis-?-vis the Nagas was. She apparently replied, ?The security of India.? To this Suisa said, ?What if the Nagas were sensitive to India?s security?? Indira Gandhi apparently told him, ?Then there is no problem.?

Suisa then proceeded to London to inform Zapu Phizo that Indira Gandhi was ready to settle the Naga issue and put his proposed solution before him. He was warned by an angry Phizo of dire consequences if he persisted with his effort. Suisa quietly withdrew from the scene.

He had, however, recognized the crux of the Naga problem and even though the time was right and the Indian leadership was willing to listen, it was the Naga leadership that failed him. Suisa was a determined man, and in retro- spect seems to have had a tremendous impact on another determined person seeking peace with India, Thuingaleng Muivah.

Suisa and Muivah come from the same village. As a youngster, Muivah was opposed to Suisa?s proposals and admits to getting very angry with him. He once said, ?I used to get so angry with him that I often felt like slapping him. But today I realize that Uncle Suisa was right. He had the correct approach to the Naga issue.?

Muivah does not endorse Suisa?s proposal, but he now claims that it was indeed a way forward. History had catapulted ?Uncle? Muivah to the role of peacemaker today. Neither the Nagas nor India should miss the opportunity again.

Often those who attempt to make peace do not know their own strength. And those who are opposed to peace deliberately try to destabilize them by creating doubts in their mind, trying to make them unsure of themselves. They also actively create roadblocks to peace to protect their vested interests.

This has been evident in the present peace process as well. But Muivah and Swu have a groundswell of support with them. The competitive, extreme and unreasonable demands of some wannabe players have not eroded their support. Their peace efforts have been underwritten by the Naga civil society organizations. The Naga people know that the ceasefire has benefited them ? internecine killings have gone down drastically and a congenial atmosphere for peaceful negotiations has been created. Muivah and Swu, therefore, come to India with a strong negotiating position.

How then should India deal with them? By recognizing that in protecting Naga interests lies the best guarantee for India?s security. Indian interests would not be served by cheating the Nagas or by doing them down. They will be best ensured by reaching an honourable settlement that alone would be the guarantee that another generation of Nagas does not take up arms.

It may not be obvious but substantial progress has been made in the Naga peace talks over time. That progress is not reflected merely in the annual cease-fire extensions, although they were important achievements in themselves. There are several yardsticks for measuring progress over the last seven years.

The peace process itself began because India recognized the Naga issue not as one of law and order but a political issue, to be settled through political means. This was the first milestone. The ceasefire agreement was the next.

In the next qualitative breakthrough, instead of using extreme language to define their position vis-?-vis India, the Nagas started talking in terms of ?division of competencies?. This signalled the Naga desire for a close and deep relationship with New Delhi as well as the recognition of India?s security concerns ? that is, the Nagas were willing to discuss which subjects could be jointly managed and which ones ought to be managed separately while not compromising on the protection of Naga identity.

Although the Nagas emphasized that the integration of all Naga areas had to be a part of the agreement, they were in effect also giving a commitment that if an agreement were reached, they would not do anything that might harm India?s interests. New Delhi also recognized that for reaching a better understanding, there was no point in limiting the talks to the framework of the Indian constitution, which in any case was not immutable.

What lent impetus to the Naga peace process was the joint communiqu? from Amsterdam on July 11, 2002, recognizing the ?unique history and situation of the Nagas?. The Nagas took it to mean that the government of India recognized that the Nagas saw themselves as a separate and unique people who were never conquered by anyone. However, the affirmation of historical separateness of the Nagas in the communiqu? was not seen as a point of arrival but as a point of departure for forging a close bond with India. The desire of the Nagas to come closer to the rest of India has also been demonstrated by the NSCN leaders through the detailed proposals that they have made to New Delhi. These proposals are now likely to be discussed substantively during the ensuing peace talks.

None of this means that the Naga peace talks will not hit bumps on the road ahead. The integration of Naga areas itself will be a tricky issue. If it is not handled properly, there is unlikely to be a permanent solution. Yet, any process for the integration of the Naga areas must give a chance to those adversely affected by it to have their say ? they should show good reason why the natural desire of the Nagas to live together is inimical to their interests.

Balancing one set of alienated people with another set is not going to be easy. The division of competencies and the new framework it would require will demand tremendous political imagination and much would depend on the politicians that the prime minister, Manmohan Singh, chooses to negotiate on New Delhi?s behalf.

However, the important point is to start this journey of joint exploration for peace. The Nagas should take a leaf out of ?Uncle? Suisa?s book and ask themselves before entering intensive peace negotiations: What is the primary concern of India vis-?-vis the Nagas? As for the Indian negotiators, they should figure out what the interests of the Nagas are and whether they can prepare a mutually acceptable roadmap to get there. Aggressive power-play and hostile emotions so prevalent when it comes to dealing with India?s north-east can never be a substitute for a well-prepared strategy of converting the Nagas from adversaries into partners for peace.