With the extension of the ceasefire with the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) for the eighth year running, the Manmohan Singh government can justifiably heave a sigh of relief. It had jeopardized the ceasefire extension by a problem of its own making.

Up to the second draft of the United Progressive Alliance’s common minimum programme, there was no mention in it of maintaining the integrity of the boundaries of India’s northeastern states. In fact, the draft CMP had promised a second states reorganization commission. This would have been a way out of the Naga integration imbroglio as well the demand for a separate Telengana state.

However, somewhere between the third draft of the CMP and its final version, a mischievous line was added and another deleted. Preserving the integrity of the boundaries of the northeastern states was added and the promise of the states reorganization commission was deleted. Was this done at the behest of those Congressmen who are given to referring to S.C. Jamir as the “Mahatma Gandhi of the North-east”? Or was it to tell the Telengana Rashtra Samithi leaders that if the changing of boundaries was not going to be easy in the northeast, then it would also not happen smoothly in the present day Andhra Pradesh?

However, the important question is: Should the future of a 54-year old insurgency in the Naga areas be decided in terms of broader national interest or partisan ones? Thankfully the government has decided to de-link the CMP from the ongoing peace process. This is wise because there has been a tremendous movement forward in the NSCN(I-M)’s positions since it entered into peace negotiations. For the first time the insurgents have taken the position that they would only accept a negotiated settlement; and they are no longer talking in terms of sovereignty and independence.

Insistence on accepting “only a negotiated settlement”means that the NSCN(I-M) is ruling out the imposition of any solution by the force of arms. Jawaharlal Nehru, who sent the army into Nagaland, thought that a solution could be forced. That has not happened in the last fifty years. The Nagas thought that they could create an independent Nagaland through an armed insurgency. That too has not happened. The idea of an independent and sovereign Naga nation straddling the boundaries of India and Myanmar (Naga tribes are also found there, and the leader of the rival NSCN, S.S. Khaplang, is a Naga from Myanmar) has been given up. This too is a significant change.

However, the framework of the Union of India cannot also be imposed on the Nagas. But it can certainly be a point of arrival. The government of India, through a path-breaking joint communiqué with the NSCN(I-M) on July 11, 2002, recognized the “unique history and situation of the Nagas.” By doing so it recognized that the Nagas were not a part of India either as a result of conquest, voluntary accession or by colonial inheritance.

New Delhi thus cleared the way for substantive negotiations to forge a close bond with the Nagas. There is plenty of flexibility in the Indian constitution for accommodating the Nagas.

The NSCN(I-M)’s negotiating posture consists of preserving the Naga identity and a division of competencies with New Delhi re-negotiating the distribution of subjects in state, central and concurrent lists of the Constitution. The NSCN(I-M) believes that the Naga identity can best flourish through the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas; New Delhi may think that non-territorial solutions may also be possible. But surely this can be discussed. A division of competencies is also within the realm of possibility.

However, at a time when India’s oldest insurgency is on the threshold of resolution, New Delhi has to be clear on why it is negotiating with the Nagas and how it plans to go about it. A ceasefire arrangement can be extended merely to soften the insurgents, to convert them from heroes fighting for a cause into extortionists to erode their legitimacy. However, negotiations can also be held to find a peaceful and honourable solution. This would involve examining the reasonableness and feasibility of the demands of the insurgents.

Accommodative states tend to gain strength. When it successfully negotiated peace with the Mizo National Front, India became stronger, not weaker. When the demands for the creation of Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh were acceded, Indian nationalism was strengthened.

Why has Nepali Maoism not been able to cross the border river at Pithoragarh and infect Uttaranchal on its other bank? Its failure to do so is not for the lack of trying. The Indian state, even if imperfect in its response, is essentially accommodative of local demands. It takes them on board through various democratic and administrative institutions and seeks a mutually acceptable resolution. The people of Uttaranchal, even if they are as poor as their Nepali cousins across the border, would therefore be reluctant to take up arms. Where the state has failed to do so, as in Bihar and Andhra, armed movements enjoy local support.

It is this broadly accommodative nature of Indian democracy that can lead to lasting peace in Nagaland and not the attitude of converting a political issue into a manageable law-and-order one. The Naga issue is a political one. If it is left to the security forces and the bureaucrats, they are bound to translate it into terms that are understandable to them — of policing and bureaucratic management.

A politician, not retired bureaucrats and intelligence officials, must, therefore, conduct the negotiations with the Nagas. Their job is to assist the political process and not determine its course.

New Delhi must also give up any attempt to weaken its Naga interlocutors. Yet, every home minister is given to the delusion that he brings new thinking to the Naga problem. L.K. Advani’s initial lack of understanding and inability to balance fairly the alienation of the Nagas with that of the Meiteis led to the Manipur assembly being set on fire. By the time he understood the issue the BJP was voted out.

Shivraj Patil is apparently exploring the possibility of including more Naga groups into the negotiations. Can the Federalists, the Naga National Council or the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) be treated on the same footing as the largest and most militant group, the NSCN(I-M)?Patil must ask himself why, despite the Federalists and the NNC signing the Shillong Accord in 1975, there has been no peace in Nagaland? If these groups could deliver, they would have done so three decades ago. Khaplang also cannot bring peace. His dependence on Indian security forces for logistics, campsites and operations is not the best-kept secret of Nagaland.

Instead of reinventing the wheel, Patil, who is known for his sharp analytical skills and uncluttered thinking, ought to reinforce the peace process. He should make the process shock-proof, negotiate with the NSCN(I-M) seriously and also help it negotiate with the other Naga groups. Only an honourable settlement with a strong adversary who can underwrite a successful agreement can lead to long-term peace. An agreement with a weak adversary is not worth the paper it is written on.