The Iraq War By John Keegan, Hutchinson, £11.40

Operation Iraqi Freedom, which unfolded between March-April 2003, is the latest American intervention against so-called “rogue states”. The collapse of a bipolar world and the American armed force’s technological superiority make such interventions possible. But the ease with which Saddam Hussain’s army was destroyed stunned even Western military analysts. In this book, John Keegan, a famous military historian, analyses the two campaigns against Saddam’s Iraq.

Keegan feels that the Iraqi army was over-estimated by Western military observers. From past records, it is clear that the Iraqi military was mediocre even in the Eighties, when Saddam invaded Iran. Compared to Iraq, Iran was industrially backward. Nevertheless, Saddam’s army was bogged down by the Iranian infantry. The highly-motivated Iranis led by the mullahs were knocking at the door of Basra when Saddam called for a ceasefire.

An army which could not tackle a regional adversary was naturally no match for a coalition army led by the world’s sole super-power. In invading Kuwait, Saddam had gambled on the West’s not acting decisively against him. But, writes Keegan, he miscalculated on how important oil was to the United States of America.

In February 1991, Iraq could muster only 150 aircraft against the US coalition’s more than 1,000. While the Americans deployed F-16s and F-18s, the Iraqi air force was largely composed of outdated MIG-21s. Thus, the Iraqi air force was compelled to take refugee in Iran. Devoid of air cover in the open desert, the Iraqi ground forces were “sitting ducks” for the US fighter-bombers. The result — after 42 days of aerial attacks, the Iraqi divisions in Kuwait were a heap of smouldering metal. The four-day ground campaign was merely a mopping-up operation.

Though Saddam’s forces were destroyed in Kuwait during the first Iraq war, the Baathist regime was allowed to continue in Baghdad. It was only after the World Trade Center bombing of 9/11, according to Keegan, that Washington became aggressive in its bid to eliminate the “axis of evil” centred around Baghdad.

In an interview to Keegan, Tommy Franks, who led the 2003 Iraq war, said that he was against a prolonged air campaign to avoid unnecessary “collateral” casualties. Actually there was no need for one because the Iraqi air force was non-existent.

The Iraqi army possessed 2,000 Soviet T-55 tanks which were veritable death traps pitted against the American Abramms, fitted with laser range-finders. As the American forces penetrated deep into Iraq, the Iraqi divisions melted away. Even the elite Republican divisions did not put up a stiff resistance. As a result, Baghdad fell easily to the Americans. The total American casualties during the second Iraq war came to about 142 and Islamic guerrillas rather than regular troops of Saddam’s army inflicted most of it.

One may disagree with Keegan’s conservative political views about the origins of the Iraq war. But even so, his book is readable and informative. From the Indian perspective, it is important to note that a large part of our arsenal, like that of the Iraqis, is composed of Soviet weaponry. And the Iraq war exposed the obsolescence of these weapons compared to the hardware made in the West.