A key missing link in India’s post-September 11 dealings with the Bush administration has been the will and the wherewithal to aggressively pursue joint efforts to cap the money trail from rich Islamic states to charities both in India and the United States of America which serve as a front for organizations and individuals promoting religious extremism.
The discussions between the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, and Indian leaders yesterday and today focussed primarily on the political, diplomatic and military aspects of the campaign to neutralize the taliban, get rid of Osama bin Laden and root out terror from its fountainhead in Afghanistan.
By all accounts, inadequate attention was paid to the financial web of terrorism, which poses as much of a threat to India as the militant activities of the Lashkar-e-Toiba or the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. The dividing line between religious extremism and terrorism, as bin Laden has demonstrated, is thin. And if New Delhi does not act swiftly to choke the funds flowing into the coffers of organizations within the country which promote religious disaffection, India will have to face the same regrets which Americans are now reflecting on for not having acted more perceptively in recent years to prevent terrorist attacks of the kind they faced last month.
One of the most perceptive statements made by the president, George W. Bush, since his campaign against terrorism acquired a new edge on September 11 may appear to be simplistic at the first glance. Yet, it is a factor in the fight against terror which governments, including the one in New Delhi, have so far ignored at their own peril.
Addressing his first formal press conference last week, Bush said “al Qaida organization cannot function without money”. Bush also claimed that a major drive was on “to reach out to willing nations to disrupt and seize assets of the al Qaida organization”. Two lists in recent days, one by the White House and another by the department of treasury, to freeze the money trail to terrorists may have given the impression to the outside world that the US is moving in dogged pursuit of terrorist funds.
Actually, such a claim falls far short of what is needed. The tragic events at the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon last month have, by no means, made the “establishment” any more flexible or reasonable. Conflicting interests within the administration continue unabated.
Thus, in the days before the treasury department announced its targets for the funds freeze last week which included Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Rabita Trust — there were bitter disagreements within the administration on who should be named in the list and how their assets were to be frozen.
The state department’s priority was to preserve the coalition which it was helping to build in the diplomatic campaign against bin Laden and the taliban. Naturally, it wanted Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be treated with kid gloves.
Just as it knew that General Pervez Musharraf was a benefactor of the Rabita Trust, which had been taken over by bin Laden’s associates in recent years, the state department knew that the creme de la creme of Saudi society have been associated with charities which had funnelled large amounts of money to bin Laden.
The Muwafaq Foundation of Saudi Arabia is a case in point. Its head, Yasin al Qadi, is among those whose assets have been frozen in the treasury department’s order. So is Ayadi Chafiq bin Muhammad, a Bosnian linked to the foundation. Indeed, the treasury department acknowledges on record that the foundation has been giving millions of dollars to bin Laden.
Yet, the Muwafaq Foundation, as an organization, has got away without its assets being frozen. Indeed, unlike Rabita Trust and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Muwafaq, whose name translates into “Blessed Relief”, has not been named in the list of organizations channelling money to terrorists.
Why? Because some of Saudi Arabia’s most powerful families are associated with the organization and naming it would have put the state department in a bind as it tries its best to bring round Saudi Arabia to meet US needs in its war against bin Laden.
For that matter Qadi himself has long had investments in the US, including a thriving stake in a diamond exploration company based in San Diego, California. Nor is this the first time that anti-terrorist agencies in the US have cited him. Some years ago, he sent $820,000 from a Swiss bank account for investment in the US. According to a case in which the US justice department froze the funds of an Illinois foundation, the Quranic Literacy Institute, some of this money went to buy weapons for the Palestinian militant group, Hamas.
Despite the administration’s kid gloves treatment of prominent Saudi families with clout in the al Saud clan, there is disappointment in Washington that Saudi Arabia has not measured up to American expectations in scrutinizing Islamic charities suspected to be linked to bin Laden’s network of terrorist financing.
Officials in the kingdom have told Washington that their search for the assets of those in the earlier White House list has not yielded worthwhile results. Officials in the treasury department have concluded that Saudi scrutiny of those accounts have been perfunctory. Even in cases where searches have turned up results, it is said that instructions to seize the assets were so slow that they have been salvaged by the owners, as in the case of the Jaish-e-Mohammed.
Why is all this important for India in its fight against terrorism? A fact, which has been lamented in North Block by the home ministry, but largely ignored by the finance ministry, is that some of the very groups and individuals who have been cited in the two American lists have been funding religious activities in India wallowing in fundamentalism and bordering on terrorism.
Just as political expediency prevented New Delhi from banning the Students Islamic Movement of India until the events of September 11, the search for vote banks and secular credentials have prevented the government from starving religious fundamentalists of funds from abroad, which could find its way to subversion.
There are piles of files in the home ministry linking Islamic charities in west Asia to subversive activity across India. But the finance ministry is feeling complacent that its archaic rules and legislations have been adequate to deal with the problem. Actually, this reflects a lack of understanding of the challenge. Legislation in India governing foreign contributions has, ironically, prevented good work in the areas of charity and human development from being undertaken: but it has not prevented money from going into subversion.
It is unrealistic to expect the government to initiate any legislation in this regard when national elections are less than three years away. Yet the problem is serious enough to warrant action.
The only practical way India can be shielded from terrorist financing, therefore, is for New Delhi to take advantage of the climate created in the US following the September 11 outrage and work with the US in shutting down charities in west Asia which are financing terrorist activities against the US as well as India.
The meeting between Powell and Indian leaders is the third high level exchange between the two countries in the month since bin Laden’s attacks against the US. That is proof against the argument that India is marginal to the current US-led campaign against global terrorism.
But the meetings which the national security adviser, Brajesh Mishra, and the external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, had in Washington DC focussed on the broader issues of the fight against global terror. The same is largely true of Powell’s meetings in New Delhi.
Any joint Indo-US operations against the financing of terrorism, therefore, remains a missing link in the efforts by Washington and New Delhi to find common ground in their campaign against terror.
The Indo-US joint working group on counter-terrorism is to meet shortly. India ought to press at this forum for action against the financing of terrorism, an aspect which has received less attention than the politico-military aspects of counter-terrorism so far.
This is necessary for practical reasons as well. Because New Delhi will be handicapped for secular reasons from legislating or even acting within the bounds of law against subversive funds flowing into the country from west Asia, the best option for the government would be to choke the funds at their source. This can be done only by enlisting the US’s cooperation by joining Washington’s campaign against terrorist financing.
India has ample evidence about the nature of terrorist financing. Since New Delhi is already sharing intelligence on the taliban and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism with the US, it ought to expand such cooperation by sharing information about terrorist financing networks in India as well.
Now that the counter-terrorism set up in the administration has been expanded well beyond the state department and conventional agencies, India ought to reach out to other agencies and lobby for a comprehensive campaign against religious charities in west Asia. This will have the definite effect of starving subversives in India of funds.